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Ihe he future of banking cannot be dis-
cussed without talking about regulation.
Simply put, regulation is what has de-
fined banking as we know it. For more
than 60 years, the Glass-Steagall Act
has defined what a banking organization
has been allowed to do; the Douglas and
other bank holding company acts have
defined the corporate form required to
do it; the national or state banking
authorities, deposit insurance agencies,
and Federal Reserve have defined how
to do it; and their supervisors and exam-
iners have tried to ensure that it was
done that way.
The reason we can discuss the future of
banking without focusing entirely on
regulation is that the current highly frag-
mented regulatory structure simply will
not serve the needs of the twenty-first
century. The power of private property
rights operating through a market econ-
omy is that, if consumers want some-
thing and are willing to pay the price,
producers will find a way to supply it.
Regulatory restraints impede market
adjustments to shifting demands. Emerg-
ing technologies and individuals' inge-
nuity will ultimately get over or around
those regulatory barriers, but it will take
time and absorb resources.
In short, regulation "gums up the works."
In the end, it will not prevent producers
from satisfying consumers' desires
except at the margin, where higher costs
and prices convey the burden of regula-
tion to the consumers who must bear it.
I am optimistic enough about our politi-
cal system to believe that if a regulation
is not producing some benefit commen-
surate with the burden it imposes on
consumers, such regulation eventually
will be removed — if not erased, then at
least not enforced. To start envisioning
the future regulatory environment of
banking, we can pose two questions.
What kinds of regulation will be neces-
sary in the future, and how fast might we
expect to move from today's outmoded
system to an era in which different regu-
lations make more sense?
• Regulation Today
Our current regulatory framework is a
product of the 1930s, designed under
emergency conditions of economic
depression that we all hope henceforth
will be irrelevant. More important, the
regulatory framework was created on the
crest of the intellectual wave of belief
that government intervention could
make the world better by planning and
controlling economic activity.
Now, despite stunning advances in com-
puter and communications technology
that might facilitate centralized control,
the wave of belief in the efficacy of gov-
ernment intervention has crashed. As a
result, hundreds of millions of people
around the world have been freed to rely
on their own initiative and on private
markets, without conforming to a gov-
ernment plan — except in our financial
sector. Here, statutory distinctions remain
in place, guiding financial activities.
How must the regulatory structure of
the financial industry change to meet
the needs of the next century? The
answer involves dismantling tradi-
tional partitions that have separated
firms, rethinking functional regula-
tion policies, and squarely facing the
problem of moral hazard created by
the federal safety net.
The landmark financial legislation of the
1930s created distinctions among three
financial market boxes — labeled
"depository institutions," "securities
underwriting and sales," and "insurance
underwriting and sales." In principle,
each of these gigantic boxes could be
subdivided into constituent compart-
ments: Depositories included separate
compartments for commercial banks,
savings and loans, mutual savings banks,
credit unions, and industrial banks; the
securities industry was subdivided into
brokerage firms, securities dealers, mort-
gage companies, and finance companies;
insurance included brokers, dealers,
underwriters, and rating agencies.
As long as all these compartments con-
tained separate, noncompeting markets,
then regulators could try to enforce dif-
ferent rules within each box. With little
danger of substitution, the costs of regu-
lation could be added to price in one
compartment without many customers
fleeing to other compartments. Regula-
tors' rules could be defined to secure apublic purpose thought to be superior to
the results of unregulated competition
within each compartment.
Today, these Glass-Steagall regulations
still force depository institutions to fit
themselves into one box only. Regula-
tions are still designed as though banks
do not compete with firms in the other
boxes. Nevertheless, depository institu-
tions, securities firms, and insurance
companies all cater to the needs of com-
mon customers.
• Regulation in the Future
Sometime in the future, these arbitrary
regulatory boxes will be thrown away.
Over the years, in fact, any natural walls
separating financial compartments have
largely fallen away, leaving increasingly
flimsy partitions made up of regulatory
restrictions whose major purpose was to
preserve tidy compartments.
Three kinds of restrictions have been used
to maintain these partitions: restrictions
on price, restrictions on location, and
restrictions on product. In general, price
restrictions are no longer important in
banking. For example, Federal Reserve
Regulation Q, which set differential max-
imum interest rates on time and savings
deposits at banks and thrifts, was disman-
tled between 1980 and 1986 in compli-
ance with the Monetary Control Act.
Statutory prohibition of interest pay-
ments on demand deposits, enacted to
prevent bank failures due to destructive
competition, is largely irrelevant today.
Increasingly, with everyone wired to-
gether by telecommunication networks,
the ability to access interest-bearing
credit balances on the books of every
reputable firm will make useless any
arbitrary definition of a "deposit."
Regulatory restrictions on location also
are a dead issue for the future of finan-
cial services. Under the provisions of
last year's Riegle bill, almost-universal
interstate branch banking will be possi-
ble and seems likely after 1997, unless
an unexpectedly large number of state
legislatures vote to opt out.
hi addition, the end of product restric-
tions is near. For example, a principal
argument for the separation of commer-
cial from investment banking under the
Glass-Steagall Act was that, if the two
were combined, banks would use their
underwriting business to repackage their
bad loans as bonds, which they then
would foist off on a gullible public. Nei-
ther logic nor historical evidence sup-
ports this argument. Customers are not
dupes, and a bank's long-run investment
in reputation is not worth throwing away
for any short-term profit gained from
selling bad bonds.
If there is to be any product regulation in
the future, it should not follow today's
approach, under which bank regulators
require companies to ask permission to
change what they are doing. Banks have
needed permission to branch, to merge,
to form a holding company, and to
acquire a subsidiary or affiliate. The
underlying philosophy has been, and
remains, "Prove to the authorities that
you should be allowed to do this."
I have a fundamental philosophical
objection to this approach. Constitution-
ally, government is supposed to bear the
burden of proof if private citizens are to
be constrained from following the dic-
tates of self-interest. Instead, banking
regulation forces private citizens to bear
the burden of proof that they be permit-
ted to act in their own self-interest.
We should put the shoe on the other foot.
Adopt an information approach, closer
to that of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Let firms notify
regulators of an innovation, then let the
regulator take the initiative to intervene
within a reasonable time with a demon-
stration that costs exceed benefits. Let
the public record and accounting state-
ments reveal what firms are doing and
how well they're performing in the mar-
ket. This is not heresy. Other nations do
it in banking, and in this country, regula-
tors outside of banking do it. We're not
in the 1930s—let producers take respon-
sibility for what they do.
• Functional Regulation
Doing away with Glass-Steagall boxes
will not clean the future regulatory slate
entirely. The legal framework of finance
and commerce will remain, including
laws that discourage fraud and misrepre-
sentation, guard against anticompetitive
practices, and require timely release of
accurate information.
It is less obvious what to expect about
so-called "functional regulation" in the
future. Functional regulations are those
rules unique to each of the Glass-
Steagall boxes and compartments. Ex-
amples are SEC shelf registration in the
securities box, reserve requirements in
the banking box, and policy reserves in
the insurance box.
Reserve requirements provide a good
example of a functional regulation mov-
ing toward extinction because its costs
exceed its benefits. Reserve requirement
levels have been reduced repeatedly
over the past 60 years, just as develop-
ments in computer technology have
made them cheaper to avoid.
The potency of a functional regulation
should be expected to decline when
costs rise relative to benefits. This may
seem to be an encouraging lesson about
the rationality of our regulatory world.
Note, however, that rationality prevails
only in the present. No matter how con-
vincing the initial case for adopting a
regulation may be, it must be reassessed
continuously. Sunset provisions are the
effective way to ensure reassessment:
Let regulations lapse on a known date
unless proponents can muster new evi-
dence of a net benefit.
• Regulation and Moral Hazard
It might be nice to stop here, saying that
we should look forward to an unregu-
lated financial services industry in the
next century. The reason I cannot stop
with that is the same reason that Con-
gress has had such difficulty in adopting
financial reform legislation.
Moral hazard is the problem. It is created
by the federal safety net, including Fed-
wire finality, the discount window, and
deposit insurance. The financial structure
of the future will depend largely on what
is done about moral hazard.
Transactions deposit liabilities of deposi-
tory institutions are a primary medium of
exchange in our economy and a primarystore of value in our financial system.
Businesses that have access to the safety
net thereby are better credit risks in
some ways than those without access.
Lenders who give credit to those with
access need not be as painstaking in their
credit evaluations or can lower the risk
premium they demand when lending,
because they are aware that the safety
net is available. In these ways, the safety
net subsidizes borrowing and risk-taking
by those with access.
The tough problem is how to remove
restrictions between the payments busi-
ness of banking and all the other busi-
nesses in which an unfettered conglom-
erate firm might want to engage. How
can banking become part of everything
else without, at one extreme, removing
the safety net subsidy or, at the other
extreme, extending both the safety net
subsidy and prudential supervision to
everything else? Between these two
extreme solutions are a few more famil-
iar suggestions:
• Proponents of "narrow banking"
would charter specialized, safe banks,
allowed to invest only in cash and other
ultrasafe assets and to issue monetary
liabilities. All other financial and nonfi-
nancial business would be conducted
from firms with no safety net available
to them.
• Advocates of "firewalls" aim at a
similar result. Some proposals, such as
that of Jim Leach, chairman of the
House Banking Committee, would allow
both bank and nonbank subsidiaries
within a financial services holding com-
pany. Only the bank subsidiary would
have access to the safety net, with limita-
tions on overlapping personnel and
intersubsidiary transactions to limit
spillovers of the safety net subsidy to
other lines of business.
• Other proposals, associated with the
current administration and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, would
rely on the formation of bank sub-
sidiaries, rather than on holding com-
pany affiliates, to carry on the nonbank-
ing activities of a conglomerate firm.
How this proposal would deal with
moral hazard is unclear.
• Coinsurance is a feature that could be
combined with others, as long as no
bank were considered "too big to fail."
Coinsurance would pull back from 100
percent insurance of deposits within the
current $100,000 per account limit.
Instead, starting at zero or more, deposi-
tors would absorb a portion of any loss.
This would reintroduce into deposit mar-
kets some of the discipline that safety
net guarantees have removed.
• How Soon Is the Future?
Some contend that this is the year for
financial reform legislation. Of course,
such things have been said before, but all
we saw were piecemeal revisions. Last
year's interstate branching legislation
was perhaps the most substantial change
since Glass-Steagall.
I do see reasons, however, for thinking
that the current Congress will enact
more complete reform legislation. A
number of powerful forces are at work
that, in combination, suggest that some-
thing must happen, and soon.
First, banks, their competitors, and their
customers are in the process of planning
for the new interstate banking environ-
ment of 1997. But planning what? To
plan effectively, they need either affirma-
tion that existing regulatory ground rules
will not be removed, or, alternatively, a
sense of the extent to which financial re-
form will proceed. Congress can expect a
lot of pressure from major players who
are tired of procrastination and who need
a more definitive basis on which to plan
for the next five to ten years.
The second reason for expecting genuine
reform is the visible disequilibrium in the
regulatory framework itself. The struc-
ture dictated by the Glass-Steagall Act,
which successfully prevented banks from
doing new things for several decades,
now seems to be disintegrating before
our very eyes. The Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency has made a pre-
emptive strike at reform, suggesting that
it may offer national banks substantially
greater freedom to enter nonbanking
lines of business through bank subsid-
iaries. If this effort prevails, the always-
delicate balance between the attractions
of national and state charters will be
tipped decisively. For state charters to
regain franchise value, substantial further
steps will need to be taken to loosen reg-
ulatory constraints on state-chartered
banks, their branches, and their holding
companies.
A third reason to expect congressional
reform is the deposit insurance premium
issue, which in the short run is building
even more insistent pressure for change
than the Comptroller's initiatives. The
Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Sav-
ings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF)
both charge close to the same premium.
BIF premiums are slated to drop soon,
because the insurance fund has been re-
plenished after a severe drain a few years
ago. SAIF premiums for thrift deposits,
however, cannot be reduced in the fore-
seeable future because the SAIF insur-
ance fund has not been replenished, and
because SAIF premium income also
services the bonded indebtedness of the
Financing Corporation (FICO). The re-
sult is an impending 19-basis-point cost
and price disadvantage for thrift deposits.
Already, the BIF/SAIF issue is having
predictable results. SAIF members that
are in sound condition are applying for
BIF-insured bank charters in order to
channel deposits to the banks. As a
result, SAIF will be subjected to a funda-
mental shock that, if left to play itself
out, would leave the fund insuring the
residual deposits of institutions unable to
escape. SAIF premium income would
decline, and FICO bond service would
be in jeopardy.
This unresolved issue illustrates a pow-
erful disequilibrium in the financial mar-
kets today that will not be ignored.
Instead, it promises to become part of
the political horse-trading and congres-
sional logrolling that will produce funda-
mental reform of the regulatory structure
of U.S. financial markets.
Underlying all of these pressures for
change is a fourth, more fundamental
force. The 1930s' intellectual conceit
that subdivided businesses and products
into neat regulatory boxes and compart-
ments was nothing more than that — a
conceit. Changing technology alonedoomed this effort. Especially as the
computer and telecommunications revo-
lution created boundless opportunities
for innovation, including money market
mutual funds and sweep accounts, the
compartments became purely imaginary
regulatory constructs.
The end is not in sight. ATM network
sharing and credit card companies have
produced nationwide — approaching
worldwide — networks that only vision-
aries imagined possible 20 years ago.
Close to 30 percent of U.S. households
have home computers of some descrip-
tion. It's not outlandish to expect that
telecommunications networks like Inter-
net will link a critical mass of house-
holds and almost all businesses within a
few years. The opportunities this creates
for innovations in commercial and finan-
cial markets cannot be predicted, but
surely are enormous. Just as great, I
believe, are the opportunities for cross-
ing Glass-Steagall boundaries among
regulatory compartments.
• Conclusion
The regulatory structure of the 1930s is
disintegrating, but financial reform
involves both a rock and a hard place.
The hard place is the inevitable jockey-
ing of various interest groups to
advance their respective competitive
advantage. Each group claims to want
its own version of reform, and contends
that no reform would be preferable to
the proposals favored by other groups.
However, the rock that prevents move-
ment past this hard place is how to limit
access to the federal safety net.
How can legislation remove the regula-
tory partitions without thereby removing
the full measure of market discipline
from activities newly associated with
payment services? Can the federal agen-
cies provide credible assurance that they
will not come to the rescue of firms that
get into trouble in activities other than
payments? Will reform be possible with-
out taking the path of least resistance,
the path of broadening access to the
safety net? All I can say is, "Stay tuned."
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